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TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS 
IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS: 
A Game-Theoretic Analysis(1) 
Tore Nyhamar 
  
  
Introduction 
This article discusses the preconditions for settling ethnic conflict through a constitutional 
compromise: democracy. The focus is on the conditions for transition to democracy amidst 
intense ethnic strife. What factors facilitate transition to democracy and what factors are 
obstacles? It is assumed that the attitude of social groups to democracy is determined by their 
leaders' rational calculations of the prospects of social, economical and political benefits. In 
other words, social groups have the capacity to formulate collective interests and act strategically 
to further them, and their leaders choose the alternative path of action with the highest expected 
benefits among those available. To extend the argument, I will first draw on some recent analysis 
in the rational choice literature on institutions. Second, I will analyse two very different contexts 
in which transitions to democracy were attempted, the events in Angola 1974-75 and in 
Zimbabwe in 1979-80. Rational choice theorists try to discover the meaning of rationality in 
different contexts, and the study of strategic choices and interaction of the six political elite 
groups in Angola and Zimbabwe, each with a core ethnic constituency, makes empirical probing 
and refining of the propositions of rational choice theory possible.  
An ethnic community is rooted in perceptions of common ascent, a shared culture or language. 
Ethnic identity is a somewhat elastic concept, taking both objective physical evidence and 
subjective group conceptions into account. A minimal scale requirement is that ethnic 
membership transcends the range of face-to-face relationships (Anderson, 1983, p. 14; Horowitz, 
1985, p. 53). A civic or national community, on the other hand, is rooted in geographic space, 
integrating laws and institutions, citizenship and shared values. The relative importance of the 
subjective and objective component in ethnicity is disputed. Those stressing the subjective 
component argue that ethnicity is a matter of choice (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawn, 1990). Those 
stressing the objective component argue that people's choice of identity is severely circumscribed 
at best (Smith, 1986; Hroch, 1985; Connor, 1994). Civic integration, or inter-ethnic nationalism, 
means that the people's preferences for identities have changed from an ethnic identification to a 
civic, national or patriotic identification. Many regard civic integration as a precondition for 
democracy (Gottlieb, 1993, pp. 43-44; McGarry & O'Leary, 1993, p. 16ff). Whatever the 
foundations of identity, replacing ethnic identities with a state citizen identity, or somehow 
separating the two, is a tall order for ending ethnic conflict. Normative commitment to 
democracy may be a necessary condition for its long-term stability, but is unlikely amid ethnic 
strife in areas with weak democratic traditions.  
Comparing Angola and Zimbabwe eliminates changes in identity and in preferences about 
democracy as causal factors because they are constant across the two cases (Meckstroth, 1975; 
Frendreis, 1983, p. 262). No significant differences in identities or preferences about democracy 
emerge among the leaders that could explain why a democratic constitution was agreed upon and 
implemented in Zimbabwe, while the attempt to establish democratic institutions failed dismally 
in Angola. Theoretically, leaders may switch to a democratic strategy even though preferences 
concerning democracy remain the same (Przeworski, 1991). Empirically, only the transition to 
democracy in Spain has been satisfactorily explained without changes in preferences about 
democracy (Colomer, 1995, pp. 1-11). This article will demonstrate that a transition to 
democracy ended the war in Zimbabwe, even though the actors' primary identification remained 
ethnic and there was no normative commitment to democracy. Moreover, the article draws 
general lessons from the two cases about how to facilitate transitions to democracy.  
  
The Theoretical Framework 
Adam Przeworski hones in on two central features of democracy: The outcome of the political 
process is uncertain, and the process is determined by "the people." To understand the potential 
of democracy for conflict resolution, the distinction between agreement about the constitution 
and agreement about substantive outcomes is crucially important. The make-up of the 
constitution affects all issues and the stakes are therefore higher in constitutional issues than in 
substantive issues. Democracy is an institutional compromise, not a compromise over outcomes. 
On the contrary, the institutional democratic compromise subjects all interests to competition. No 
group can reverse an undesired outcome ex post facto; democracy is the institutionalisation of 
uncertainty. On the other hand, an established democracy reduces the stakes of the political game 
because specific outcomes may always be reversed later.  
A transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule has taken place when the threshold 
beyond which no one can intervene to reverse the outcomes of the political process has been 
crossed (Przeworski, 1991, p. 14). Przeworski argues the evidence available to him that a 
necessary precondition for transition is that the "right," the former undemocratic power holders, 
are able to win the first election because they will not relinquish control of outcomes unless they 
are reassured immediately that they can compete effectively for power under democracy. Two 
social groups are especially important during transitions to democracy because they often 
possess the capability to control the political process ex post facto: those with arms and those 
who control productive resources (Przeworski, 1988, p. 72; Przeworski, 1991, p. 51). Armed 
ethnic groups have the ability to reverse policy outcomes; their disarmament is therefore 
necessary for the transition to democracy to be complete.  
Second, the transition to democracy is facilitated if economic and political privileges are 
separable. In Eastern Europe, the old nomenklatura class supposedly had access to property only 
by virtue of their position within the power apparatus. In Spain and Latin America, the former 
power holders could abandon political control while retaining their economic position. The 
transition was easier in the latter case because the stakes were lower--the play was only for 
political, not economic survival (Przeworski, 1988, p. 75).  
The central feature of the democratic process is that it invariably produces periodic winners and 
losers. The question is why the losers should comply with the outcome of the democratic 
process. There are three possible answers. First, compliance may be spontaneous, motivated by 
self-interest. Complying with the outcome, even when it is a defeat, and acting within the 
institutional framework, is better for the relevant political forces than trying to subvert 
democracy. Second, compliance may be enforced. Democracy holds because actors that would 
be better off not accepting the outcome are punished by an exogenous third party. Third, 
compliance may be morally motivated. People accept outcomes detrimental to their interests 
because they are morally committed to democratic institutions. Spontaneous compliance makes 
democracy more likely, since one should not expect too much morally inspired commitment to 
democracy in situations of ethnic violence. If the actors are self-interested and act strategically, 
spontaneous compliance requires the outcome of the political process to constitute a Nash 
equilibrium. In equilibrium, the individual actors' strategies are a best reply to each other, 
yielding a stable outcome because no one will regret his choice of strategy.  
The expected life of institutions is longer than the expected effects of individual policies. 
Institutions thus create iterated games between political elites. More precisely, preferences over 
institutions can be considered to be preferences over streams of outcomes or policies because the 
institutions create repeated political situations (Tsebelis, 1990, p. 104). However, everything 
need not be unknown about the effects of the constitutional arrangements introduced in a 
transition situation. Indeed, knowledge of the kinds of outcomes different constitutions produce 
makes it possible for actors to have preferences over institutions. Institutions can not be neutral. 
On the other hand, the transition to democratic institutions is a one-shot game between the 
leaders of the armed groups. The transition phase includes the cease-fire, disarmament, and the 
first elections. Only when the parties have been disarmed and have elected their representatives, 
can the parties expect to play a repeated political game.  
To lay bare the essential features of the choice situation facing the leaders of armed ethnic 
groups, I will assume that they only have the choice between a Democratic strategy and a 
Military strategy. The choice of one strategy by each actor leads to a jointly determined outcome 
that entails a payoff for each actor. In the case of mutual Democratic strategy, each player 
receives democratic compromise DC. In the case of mutual Military strategy, each player 
receives the civil war outcome CW. If one actor pursues the Democratic strategy and the other 
the Military strategy, the actor choosing the Democratic strategy receives the sucker's payoff S, 
and the actor choosing the Military strategy the temptation payoff T. Three different orders of 
preferences on democratic compromise, civil war, sucker and temptation emerge among the 
actors in the Angola and Rhodesia conflicts: T > DC > CW > S (preferences or payoffs like in 
Prisoner's Dilemma game); T > CW > DC > S (payoffs like in the Deadlock game); and DC > T 
> CW > S (payoffs as in the Assurance game). To get an initial impression of how these 
preference orders affect choices, let us consider each of the single-shot two-by-two game they 
create. In the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Deadlock games, the Military strategy is 
dominant (better regardless of what the other actors does), and CW is the only equilibrium. In the 
Assurance Game, the players do not have any dominant strategy, and, consequently, there are 
two equilibria: mutual Military strategy leading to the CW outcome and mutual Democratic 
strategy leading to the DC outcome.  
In one-shot games, the preferences of the actors determine the outcome. In the Assurance Game, 
the DC outcome is the socially optimal Nash-equilibrium both in the one-shot and the iterated 
version of the game. In iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Assurance Game, on the other hand, the 
Democratic strategy is more likely to occur the greater the difference in payoffs between the DC 
and CW outcomes. The power of the backwards induction argument prevented understanding 
that the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma has different equilibria than one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma: 
Since the last round is known in advance, both players will choose the Military strategy as there 
is no future influence. Given this common knowledge, both players will choose the Military 
strategy in the penultimate round, and the possibility of democratic compromise will unravel in 
the same way until the first round.(2)  
If the Prisoner's Dilemma game is played infinitely, or a large unknown number of times, the 
Democratic strategy may be chosen under complete information. First, if you know that your 
opponent will choose 'Always military strategy' as her strategy in the repeated game (for 
whatever reason, narrow-mindedness, paranoia, belligerence or believing in backwards 
induction), your best reply is 'Always military strategy,' and it thus forms a Nash-equilibrium 
with itself. Moreover, if your opponent plays 'Always democratic strategy,' your best reply is 
'Always military strategy,' and the implication is that 'Always democratic strategy' does not form 
a Nash-equilibrium with itself. In fact, knowledge that the opponent will use any strategy that is 
not dependent on her own, makes 'Always military strategy' the preferred choice (Tsebelis, 1990, 
p. 75). However, if the players let their choice of strategy be contingent upon the other player's 
choice in the previous round(s), the Democratic strategy may be chosen. The best known 
contingent strategy is Tit-for-Tat, who chooses the Democratic strategy in the first round and in 
all later rounds of the game matches the opponent's choice in the previous round. Tit-for-Tat 
immediately punishes the Military strategy by choosing the Military strategy in the next round 
(Morrow, 1994, p. 260ff). To conclude, in one-shot games and repeated games without 
contingent strategies, the actors' preferences determine the outcome. With the exception of the 
Deadlock game, in iterated games with contingent strategies, the magnitude of the payoffs 
determine the likelihood of adopting the different strategies. To study the effects of iteration 
further, we need a discount parameter. The discount parameter expresses that unlike present 
payoffs, future payoffs are uncertain, and that even certain future payoffs may be of less worth 
for an actor than present ones.  
The Democratic strategy is more likely to be supported as a Nash-equilibrium as: the value the 
players put on future payoffs increases, the reward from cheating decreases (T decreases), the 
cost of armed conflict increases (CW increases), the democratic compromise yields higher 
returns (DC increases), and the cost of attempting a transition to democracy increases (S 
increases). But contingent strategies have four limitations in inducing co-operation in repeated 
Prisoner's Dilemmas (Morrow, 1994, p. 267). First, 'Always military strategy' is always a sub-
game perfect equilibrium for any discount parameter.(3) Second, reciprocal punishments may not 
be credible because the players are better off not playing the Military strategy. Third, in addition 
to 'Always military strategy,' there is a large number of other outcomes that satisfies the demands 
of an equilibrium solution, and no obvious way to choose between them. Finally, the players can 
not know which equilibrium they are playing. Without a common conjecture of what contingent 
strategy they are playing, the players may fail to co-ordinate on punishments that enforce co-
operation.  
  
Ethnic Conflict in Angola and in Zimbabwe 
There are three main ethnic groups in Angola: the Mbundu, the Bakongo, and the Ovimbundu. 
After the Portuguese arrival in 1483, the three ethnic groups were contained in different political 
systems until the Portuguese finally established control over the whole territory as late as in 
1915. In turn, all three ethnic groups traded members of the other groups to the Portuguese. At 
least two million slaves reached the New World from Angola, and it has been estimated that a 
similar number died in transit. To put these numbers into perspective, Angola's total population 
in 1983 was estimated to 8.3 million. The separate political systems of the three groups during 
more than four centuries, the extensive trading of slaves and the Portuguese policy of playing the 
groups off against one another, had the predictable result of creating deep ethnic conflict in 
Angola.  
On the other hand, the three Angolan liberation movements, the MPLA (Movimento Popular de 
Libertação de Angola), the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, and the UNITA 
(União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola), all had Angolan nationalist 
perspectives: All three vehemently denounced tribalism and regionalism, and none relied 
exclusively on the support of one ethnic group(4) Nevertheless, the conflict among the three 
movements increasingly assumed a de facto ethno-regional character during 1975 as competition 
fuelled the efforts to consolidate their core base of support. The MPLA had its main base of 
support among the 1.5 million Mbundu concentrated in the Cuanza valley and in Luanda. The 
FNLA mobilised the Bakongos in the north-west of Angola and the refugees in Zaire, about 1 
million. The UNITA had its traditional support among the 2.5 million Ovimbundus in the south. 
The three main groups make up about 75% of Angola's population (Ovimbundu 37%, Mbundu 
23% and Bakongo 14%). A large number of smaller tribes make up the remaining 25%.  
In Rhodesia, the most important ethnic division was between Whites and Blacks. After the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, Rhodesian society was organised according to 
ethnicity. In 1980, almost 60% of the income was earned by the 4% White minority. The Land 
Tenure Act of 1969 formally divided the territory equally between the 4% Whites and the 96% 
Blacks; both groups got 46.6% of the land, while the remaining 6.8% was national land. In 
practice, the differences were even larger because most of the land allotted to the Blacks was 
held in a form of customary tenure (41.3% of the 46.6%) and areas open to freehold occupation 
by Blacks was small (3.8% of the 46.6%). In comparison, 40% of the White's 46.6% of the land 
had no restrictions, the remaining 6.5% were parks and wildlife reserves. Moreover, the land 
reserved for Whites included more than three-fourths of the highlands, and roughly two-fifths of 
the middleveld, the areas most suited for agriculture in Zimbabwe. The reason for reserving land 
for Blacks at all was to create the cheapest labour possible by forcing the families of workers 
into providing for themselves through subsistence farming, creating wages so low that they only 
provided for the workers. The White policy forced a restructuring of Black society and 
disruption of agricultural techniques. Economic and political inequalities and social upheavals 
created widespread resentment. Estimates of casualties in the war vary, but the most conservative 
indicate nearly 20,000 war-related deaths over the whole 1974-80 period. Losses rose sharply to 
over 1,000 a month at the peak of the fighting in 1979. Thus, ethnic relations between Blacks and 
Whites in Zimbabwe in 1980 were certainly bad.(5)  
The Black population of Zimbabwe is dominated by two tribes, the Shona (75%) and the 
Ndebele (19%). The Ndebele is an ethnic category that grew out of a military state created in 
1830-1840, encompassing peoples of different origins. In fact, Shonas living in conquered areas 
included into Ndebele society after 1840 constitute one of the largest components of the 
Ndebele. Ethnic identifications in both groups were fairly low, there was no history of enmity 
between them, and they even shared the history of the Ndebele-Shona Chimurenga resistance of 
1896-97 against the British. Moreover, as in Angola, the two guerrilla movements appealed to 
Zimbabwean nationalism, and neither recruited exclusively from one ethnic group. Nevertheless, 
the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) was associated with the Shonas and the ZAPU 
(Zimbabwe African People's Union) with the Ndebele.(6)  
In conclusion, the most serious conflict among the six groups was the conflict between Whites 
and Blacks in Zimbabwe. The tripartite conflict among the Bakongos, Mbundus and 
Ovimbundus in Angola also ran very deep, but was nevertheless more benign than the former. 
The mildest ethnic conflict was between the Shonas and the Ndebele in Zimbabwe.  
  
The Dependent Variable: The Fate of Democracy 
On January 15, 1975, the three Angolan liberation movements signed the Alvor Accord setting 
the date of November 11, 1975, for Angolan independence. On this date the Portuguese would 
hand over power to a coalition government composed of representatives of the three liberation 
movements. Until November 11, the Alvor Accord provided for a transitional government where 
the liberation movements shared power with the Portuguese administration. The transitional 
government was to create an Angolan Army from the military forces of the three liberation 
movements. It was also to draft a provisional constitution, draw up an electoral law and register 
voters and candidates for the Constituent Assembly. Elections were to be held before the end of 
October, 1975. The Angolan transitional government thus was intended to perform two tasks 
simultaneously: draft the constitution and run the country.  
The transitional regime, established in Luanda on March 28, 1975, soon fell apart. Military 
clashes between the three organisations became increasingly frequent during the spring of 1975, 
and from July on the situation deteriorated into full-fledged civil war. The Lisbon Government 
made a last attempt to restore its authority in July 1975 by sending in troop reinforcements, but 
the attempt proved feeble. In August, the Portuguese formally annulled the Alvor Accord and 
dissolved the defunct transitional government. Nothing was put in its place. At the date of 
independence, November 11, all liberation movements declared their own national governments, 
while the MPLA and the FNLA were fighting a battle outside the capital Luanda. The 
Portuguese withdrew without having surrendered power to anyone in particular.(7)  
On October 22, 1979, an agreement on the constitution of the future Zimbabwe was signed at 
Lancaster House in London. The agreement was a constitutional compromise. The White 
Rhodesians, 4% of the population, got 20 of the total 100 seats in Parliament, while the Black 
Zimbabweans got the remaining 80.(8) The parties reached agreement on the transitional 
government in November and on the cease-fire arrangements late in December, 1979, securing 
that elections were carried out in March 1980. The elections resulted in an unexpectedly large 
victory for ZANU and Robert Mugabe. They won 57 of the 80 Black seats (with 63% of the 
votes cast), ZAPU won 20 seats (with 24% of the votes), while the white hope, UANC (United 
African Nation Congress), won only 3 seats (with 8% of the votes). The Rhodesia Front won the 
20 White seats. Robert Mugabe became Prime Minister as Zimbabwe became independent on 
April 18, 1980. The new government immediately began to reorganise the armed forces, and the 
White minority thus soon lost control over their last instrument to overturn the new constitution 
and to reverse the outcomes of the political process. In Rhodesia, a peaceful transition to 
majority rule and democracy took place in the middle of a bloody war created by the most severe 
ethnic conflict, whereas in Angola the attempt at transition ended in war.  
  
Democracy and the Struggle for Political Power 
How did the actors rank the payoffs DC (democratic compromise), CW (civil war), S (sucker) 
and T (temptation)? For all of them, we can assume that the worst outcome was S, facing the 
Military strategy while pursuing a Democratic strategy yourself. Second, the actors probably 
preferred T > CW, getting autocratic power for free was better than fighting a war that may lead 
to autocratic power. To complete the ranking of the payoffs for each player, we need to draw on 
the ideology and behaviour of the six actors.  
In Angola, the FNLA did not advocate democracy but an international class struggle interpreted 
in terms of racial concepts. Black people were the exploited proletariat, and white people were 
the exploiting bourgeoisie. The FNLA leadership and membership were almost exclusively of 
Bakongo background, so in practice 'Black' meant 'Bakongo'. The FNLA made an attempt to 
seize power in November 1974, but were persuaded by President Kenyatta of Kenya to return to 
the negotiations leading to the Alvor Accord. In February and March 1975, before the 
transitional government was established, FNLA forces reinforced with motorised Zairian units, 
moved into Angola from Zaire to attack the MPLA in Luanda, and broadened its attacks to 
MPLA forces outside the capital in April. The FNLA clearly preferred the Military strategy, 
delivering the principal blow in unsettling the possibilities of a compromise on democratic 
institutions. Since the FNLA counted on a swift victory, it is not possible to determine whether 
they preferred the mutual democracy outcome to the civil war outcome. Thus, we can not infer 
from the power struggle alone whether the FNLA had the preferences T > DC > CW > S 
(Prisoner's Dilemma) or T > CW > DC > S (Deadlock).  
The MPLA was primarily committed to traditional international class struggle rather than 
democracy. The leadership had an urban character, consisting of blacks assimilated into 
Portuguese culture or persons with partially white parentage, and the movement emphasised 
Portuguese culture as a factor favouring national integration in Angola. The MPLA leadership 
was made up of persons that could expect to prosper individually under democratic competition. 
The MPLA did not carry out a bid for power before the Alvor Accord and abided by the 
agreement until attacked, suggesting that the organisation was willing to tolerate democratic 
political competition. On the other hand, no positive initiatives were forthcoming in the 
transitional government, indicating that the MPLA had democracy only as a second-best 
outcome, but better than civil war. Thus, the MPLA appears to have had the preferences, T > DC 
> CW > S (Prisoner's Dilemma).  
The UNITA was essentially dominated by the undemocratic but charismatic personality of Jonas 
Savimbi, who appealed to ethnic and tribal Ovimbundu sentiments. He initially pursued a 
strategy aiming at political compromise, but willingly switched to the Military strategy when 
South African assistance tempted him with control of Luanda. Hence, democratic compromise 
was not Jonas Savimbi's best outcome but it was better than civil war, yielding the preferences T 
> DC > CW > S (Prisoner's Dilemma).  
In Zimbabwe, Ian Smith often stated his opposition to democracy and repeatedly rejected real 
powersharing solutions from 1974 and onwards. The so-called internal settlement of March 3, 
1978, the Rhodesia Front's own attempt to come to terms with the Black majority, gave the 
White population 28 of the 100 seats in Parliament, a blocking fourth for constitutional change 
under the new constitution. In addition, control over public service, police and defence forces 
remained on White hands, preserving the power to undemocratically alter policy outcomes ex 
post facto. However, in October 1979, the Rhodesia Front compromised, revealing the 
preferences T > DC > CW > S (Prisoner's Dilemma). But Ian Smith himself refused to budge and 
had to be removed by his own party. This incident has been interpreted in two ways. The first is 
that he was sincere in his wish to go down fighting rather than compromise, giving Deadlock 
preferences T > CW > CR > S (Stedman, 1991). The second is that this was tactical ploy where 
he counted on being removed, allowing himself to be seen fighting to the bitter end, giving 
Prisoner's Dilemma preferences (Tamarkin, 1990).  
The war in Rhodesia was about majority rule but not necessarily about democracy since an 
undemocratic Black regime was a possibility. Both ZAPU and ZANU officially endorsed 
democracy as a solution to end the war. The split between ZAPU and ZANU in 1963 had 
occurred over whether a Military strategy should be adopted, ZANU breaking away to begin the 
armed struggle. Nkomo tried to negotiate a separate agreement with Ian Smith both in 1976 and 
1978, and the attempts only failed because Smith was not prepared to accept majority rule. 
Nkomo adopted the Military strategy only when compromise failed, and when military inactivity 
had become a political liability. Interestingly, Nkomo's did not opt for guerrilla warfare, building 
a conventional force to deliver Salisbury the final blow (Tamarkin, 1990, p. 100). It was no 
coincidence that Nkomo's military strategy led to very little actual fighting. Assurance Game 
players will opt for the Military strategy if others choose the Military strategy, but Nkomo's first 
preference remained the CR outcome, yielding the preferences, CR > T > CW > S (Assurance 
Game).  
Robert Mugabe did want majority rule in Zimbabwe, but ideologically he believed that allowing 
multiple parties might cause ethnically diverse African countries to fall apart. He never thought 
that Ian Smith would yield on the crucial issue of majority rule before the military situation was 
ripe, and considered negotiating with him politically harmful. But Mugabe's reluctance did not 
stem ideology or principle, as one diplomat stated "He believed in armed struggle, because of 
Smith.(9) ZANU was militarily stronger and more active than ZAPU in the guerrilla war, 
suffering large losses -- 7000 dead in 1979 alone out of a total force of about 50,000. The morale 
of its forces was unbroken and Robert Mugabe was on his way to military victory, but he was not 
ideologically opposed to a settlement (Stedman, 1993, p. 138). His preferences were thus T > DC 
> CW > S (Prisoner's Dilemma).  
  
Democracy and the Struggle for Economic Benefits 
To say that Holden Roberto headed the FNLA is an understatement; he was the FNLA. The 
FNLA had virtually no fixed organisational structures. Roberto's style of leadership was entirely 
based on personal ties. His great grandfather and his maternal grandfather who had headed 
Bakongo nationalist exile groups in Belgian Congo (Zaire), and he divorced his first wife to 
marry the sister of Zaire's Mobuto Seke Seko, who repeatedly intervened military on Roberto's 
behalf during 1975. Personal patron-client relationships consist of the resources of patronage, 
combined with loyalty transcending mere interest, yet always remaining conditional. Before 
independence, Roberto depended upon foreign support to provide the necessary resources, and 
his attempts to secure it was the central motive in his policy from the late 1950s.(10) After 
independence, control of the main dispenser of patronage, government, was within his reach. 
FNLA was not a unitary actor in a trivial sense because of the game between leader and 
followers, but the organisation had the ability to formulate collective interests and to act 
strategically to pursue them. Since his demands on patronage was incompatible with the 
uncertainties of democracy, Roberto's preferences were T > CW > DC > S (Deadlock) and not T 
> DC > CW > S (Prisoner's Dilemma).  
There were also certain elements of personal and family ties in the position of MPLA's central 
leader, Agostinho Neto, but far less pronounced than in the FNLA. The MPLA was mainly based 
on people who owed their position to how they filled a role within the organisation. In addition, 
the military organisation was part of a larger, formalised structure (Marcum, 1978; Marcum, 
1987b, p. 18). UNITA also had an effective organisation, depending on Savimbi for charismatic 
leadership more than patronage. Like Holden Roberto, the leaders of the MPLA and UNITA 
preferred autocratic power to democracy, but since their leadership did not depend on patronage, 
the uncertainties of democracy was tolerable.  
In Zimbabwe, both the ZANU and the ZAPU had a reasonably strong formal organisational 
infrastructure. Neither organisation depended on patronage for its existence. They were able to 
field large, effective military forces. The ZANU had about 50.000 men under arms in 1980, and 
they did not need external aid to maintain the organisations as such.  
For the Whites, a democratic compromise was fully compatible with retaining economic stature. 
The possibility of preserving the White "way of life" under majority rule gave the Rhodesians 
incentives to compromise. Even the Sucker outcome might be acceptable since the economy 
would collapse if their property was confiscated. No future ruler of Zimbabwe could want to 
eliminate the most productive sector of the economy.  
  
The Angola and the Rhodesia Game 
The 'Angola game' was a three-person-game, where the MPLA and UNITA had Prisoner's 
Dilemma preferences and the FNLA had Deadlock preferences:  
If FNLA chooses DS,  
UNITA chooses  
 DS MS  
MPLA DS 2,3,3  1,1,4 
chooses MS 1,4,1 1,2,2 
   
If FNLA chooses MS,  
UNITA chooses  
 DS MS 
MPLA DS 4,1,1 3,1,2 
chooses MS 2,3,1 3,2,2* 
   
The Deadlock player FNLA rejects the Democratic strategy (DS) in the Angola game, both when 
it is played once, and when it is reiterated. Given that choice, the MPLA and UNITA will choose 
the 'Always military strategy,' too, and the choice of (MS,MS,MS) results in the CW outcome 
with payoffs (3,2,2), forming the unique solution (*) regardless of the number of repetitions.  
The 'Rhodesia Game' was a three-person game where the RF and ZAPU had Prisoner's Dilemma 
preferences, and ZAPU Assurance preferences:  
If RF chooses the DS strategy  
ZAPU chooses  
 DS MS 
ZANU DS 3,4,3 1,1,4 
chooses MS 1,3,1 1,2,2 
   
If RF chooses the MS strategy,  
ZAPU chooses  
 DS MS 
ZANU DS 4,1,1 2,1,2 
chooses MS 2,2,1 2,2,2* 
   
If the Rhodesia game is played once, the RF and ZANU have the Military strategy (MS) as their 
best strategy regardless of the choice of the others. Furthermore, given that RF and ZANU 
chooses the Military strategy, ZAPU's best choice is to choose the Military strategy, too. Thus, 
the only Nash-equilibrium and the solution of if the game is played once is (MS,MS,MS) with 
payoffs (2,2,2).  
In the iterated game, any individually rational outcome can be supported as an equilibrium 
outcome. Since actors with Prisoner's Dilemma and Assurance game preferences can guarantee 
themselves at least the Civil War outcome regardless what the others do, any outcome improving 
on that is in equilibrium. There are indefinitely many such outcomes, because mutual co-
ordination to democratic compromise may occur (or unravel) at any given point in time. Let us 
see whether the magnitude of the payoffs T, CW, DC and S, influenced the outcome in the 
repeated political game under the constitution.  
  
The Choice of Strategy in Iterated Games: The Magnitude of the Payoffs 
The payoffs associated with the Sucker and Temptation outcomes are disregarded because they 
were constant. Two factors stand out in shaping the magnitude of the payoffs of the CW and DC 
outcomes in Angola and Zimbabwe; relative military strength, and relative electoral strength. 
Estimates of the military forces of the three Angolan movements at the time of the Alvor Accord 
vary, but all agree that the FNLA was numerically superior. Klinghoffer (1980, pp. 15-17) 
estimates that the FNLA had 10,000 men under arms, the MPLA 6,000 and UNITA about 2,000, 
while Marcum (1978, p. 257) estimates numbers at 21,000 (FNLA), 8,000 (MPLA) and 8,000 
(UNITA). The military situation was complicated by a break-away faction of the MPLA headed 
by Daniel Chipenda that joined forces with the FNLA in February 1975, and a Katangese force 
that joined the MPLA in April 1975 because of the FNLA's close links with Zaire. Estimates of 
these forces also vary, the Klinghoffer estimate gives the figure 2,000-3,000 for the Chipenda 
force, the Marcum estimate says that the Chipenda force numbered 2,000-2,750 men and the 
Katangese force 3,500-6,000. On July 9, 1975, heavy fighting broke out involving all three 
Angolan movements. Although superior in numbers and armaments, the FNLA forces and 
leadership proved completely inept. Even with more support from Zaire and collaboration 
between FNLA and UNITA, the MPLA soon gained the upper hand.  
The assumed military strength of the three Angolan liberation movements did not mirror their 
base of support. The movement with the largest ethnic base, the UNITA, was the militarily 
weakest. The movement with the smallest ethnic constituency, the FNLA, had most men under 
arms in the beginning of 1975. Consequently, the FNLA stood to lose the most in a democratic 
system, and the UNITA stood to gain. The UNITA initially advocated settling the conflict 
through elections.(11) The FNLA tried to win power in Angola by military means, a choice of 
strategy determined both by Deadlock preferences and by being stronger militarily than 
electorally. The MPLA, the only actor with a balance between military and electoral strength on 
the Angolan scene, did not initially play the Military strategy, but on the other hand never 
considered the Democratic strategy when violence had broken out. The unstable military 
situation increased the payoffs of the civil war outcome to the MPLA in July 1975, and to the 
UNITA in October 1975.  
The war in Zimbabwe was a typical guerrilla war. The Rhodesian Army could move wherever it 
wished, but was unable to prevent the guerrillas from flowing into Rhodesian territory. The 
Rhodesian Forces had high morale and were well trained, enabling them to hold the guerrillas at 
bay though rarely fielding more than 4000 men. Total forces, all units and reserves included, 
were about 46,000 men (Rinehart, 1983, pp. 57-58; Butts, 1990, p. 28). Their kill ratio advantage 
over the guerrillas was up from 10 to 1 in 1974 to 14 to 1 in 1979 (Stedman, 1991, p. 74). The 
Rhodesian Army remained a formidable fighting force but could not win the war. The burden of 
financing the war was crippling expenditures classified as "war costs" accounted for 41% of total 
public spending in Rhodesia in 1979 (Rinehart, 1983, p. xxiv). The main asset of the Rhodesian 
Front in the negotiations was that the guerrilla force was too weak to succeed in a conventional 
attack on Salisbury. Mugabe and Nkomo (and their military advisers) had different beliefs about 
the military situation. Mugabe believed that he was winning the war and would defeat the 
Salisbury regime shortly. Nkomo, on the other hand, also believed that they would eventually 
win but at a prohibitive high cost, because guerrilla warfare could not bring victory, necessitating 
a conventional attack at Salisbury (Stedman, 1993, pp. 136-137). In an ambiguous military 
situation, because it ultimately rested on White reactions to economic hardship in an unwinnable 
war, the parties preferences influenced their assessment.  
From 1974 to about 1978, the Rhodesia Front showed no inclination to compromise during the 
frequent negotiations. The Constitution adopted in March 1970 reserved 20 seats for Blacks and 
50 for Whites in a parliament of 70. The Black seats fell well short of the blocking third needed 
to prevent constitutional change. The combination of military preponderance and an extremely 
narrow ethnic base explains the reluctance to accept democracy. When the military situation 
worsened in 1978-79, reducing the payoff of the Civil War outcome, the expected payoff of the 
democratic compromise was increased by a glimmer of hope that white overrepresentation and 
an alliance with the moderate Blacks would yield a sufficiently large constituency to preserve 
some political influence. The elections in April 1979, carried out under the internal settlement, 
had given the moderate UANC headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa 51 of the 72 seats reserved for 
Blacks (62.3% of the votes), and the turnout was 64.45% of the electorate.(12) The guerrilla 
movements had boycotted the elections, and their strength at the ballot box was unknown. It has 
even been suggested that the RF and South Africa accepted the outcome of the elections only 
because ZANU's victory was a landslide, eliminating the possibility of crying foul play and 
shattering illusions of Black support for White rule. However, Zimbabwe is above all an 
interesting example of a conflict where a party was willing to settle in spite of having no chance 
of ever winning an election. The Rhodesia Front faced the choice between a certain military 
defeat in the long run or a democratic constitution with a hope of a continued say in Zimbabwean 
politics.  
Table 1. Preferences, relative military and electoral potential and initial choice of strategy.  
Organizatio RF ZANU ZAPU FNLA MPLA UNITA 
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Prisoner's 
Dilemma 
Prisoner's 
Dilemma 
Assurance Deadlock 
Prisoner's 
Dilemma 
Prisoner's 
Dilemma 
Military 
Potential 
Above 
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Above 
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average 
Above 
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Electoral 
Potential 
4%   
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75% Shona 
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Mbundu 
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Mil/Elec. 
Balance 
Stronger 
Military 
Balanced Balanced 
Stronger 
military 
Balanced 
Stronger 
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Initial Strategy  Military  Military  Democratic  Military  Democratic  Democratic 
   
To conclude, the fortunes of war and electoral prospects strongly affected the actors' initial 
choice of strategy. Moreover, changes in the fortunes of war, i.e. the payoffs associated with the 
CW outcome, goes a long way to explain the changes in strategy among the actors during the 
conflict. In Angola, there was no costly war creating incentives to reach agreement when the 
transitional government began to negotiate agreement on a constitution. In Zimbabwe, on the 
other hand, the Lancaster House Conference was carried out during the bloodiest phase of the 
civil war, creating powerful incentives to end the fighting (Zartman, 1989, p. 260). Generally, the 
more destructive the conflict, the greater the incentives to end it. Let us consider the propositions 
of the game-theoretic analysis for a more complete understanding of the actors' choices between 
the Democratic and the Military strategy.  
Discount Parameters  
Leaders of armed ethnic groups operate in a highly unstable political environment, forcing them 
to concentrate on activities leading to immediate gains in security. There is a high probability of 
political marginalisation before democracy arrives, and consequently, the discount rate for future 
benefits that democracy may accrue is high. In Angola, the volatile military situation in 1975 
resulted in an extreme version of this problem, rendering a negotiated transition to democracy 
impossible. The military situation was more stable in Rhodesia, creating an environment for 
prolonged negotiations. In addition, the White Rhodesians found the probability that their 
property would be confiscated after the elections low, because they knew that it would lead to 
economic disaster. Thus, promises to respect property rights were credible, lowering the White 
discount rate. But the uncertainty of future rewards proved a real problem also in Zimbabwe. 
According to one diplomat, "Mugabe was convinced that he would win an election, but was 
unsure he would have a chance to win an election."(13) Note that white economic privileges not 
only made the democratic compromise outcome more attractive, but, more importantly, offered a 
credible guarantee of long-term benefits for a group surely facing long-term political 
marginalisation. The economy would collapse if their property was confiscated, and no future 
ruler of Zimbabwe could want to eliminate the most productive sector of the economy. The 
electoral privileges that were to expire in 1990 were unconstitutionally removed in 1987-88, 
when Robert Mugabe abrogated the White minority constitutional rights ahead of schedule. 
However, White economic dominance has deterred any action so far. White economic privileges 
made the Democratic strategy rational even if the Whites were to become a permanent minority 
without any say in the iterated political game or if the iterated political game is cut short by the 
winners of the first elections, making it difficult to generalise this aspect of the Zimbabwean 
experience to cases where the parties can only be rewarded by the political game.  
Agreement in Iterated Games and in One-shot Games  
Lord Carrington's tactics at Lancaster House was to keep the issues strictly separated. The first 
issue was the constitution, then the transitional arrangements, and finally, the cease-fire. After 
six weeks of hard negotiations, ZANU and ZAPU, who had united politically under the Patriotic 
Front umbrella for Lancaster House, accepted the constitution on September 18, 1979. 
Agreement was reached with Lord Carrington fully in control of issues and proposals, in spite of 
many Patriotic Front attempts to wrestle the initiative from him (Davidow, 1984, pp.61-61). 
Moreover, no ultimatum from the Front Line presidents was necessary to make the Patriotic 
Front accept the Constitution, even with property rights enshrined in the Constitution: Land had 
to be voluntarily sold and paid for at once with full, market-level compensation. This provision 
made land reform impossible, setting aside the most important political issue in Zimbabwe.  
On November 12, during the negotiations on transitional arrangements, Carrington had tomake 
public that there would be a Commonwealth monitoring force to supervise the cease-fire. 
Although Carrington had been "loath to discuss the cease-fire before an agreement on the 
transition," he had to relinquish control in order to make it easier for the parties to see the coming 
advantages that would result from agreement on the transition (Stedman, 1991, pp. 195). A 
transition agreement was reached on November 15. On November 26, during the life-and-death 
issues of the cease-fire, Carrington issued an ultimatum on the British proposals, prompting 
Mugabe to fly to Dar Es Salaam to meet the Front Line presidents. "I am not going to stand for 
my forces being herded like cattle into these detention centres at the mercy of the Rhodesian 
army and air force," Mugabe said (Smith & Simpson, 1981, p. 141). The Front Line presidents 
persuaded Carrington to make concessions, including close monitoring of the Rhodesian forces, 
particularly the Rhodesian air force. This was the only time Carrington had to yield from 
arbitration during Lancaster House, but he still saw no need to prolong the cease-fire (Stedman, 
1991, p. 199). On December 16, after having extracted the concession of a sixteenth assembly 
point 'somewhere in the centre of Rhodesia,' Nkomo was satisfied, but Mugabe still balked, for 
reasons that have puzzled analysts. The physical security of his troops was not an issue anymore. 
The military leader of ZANU's forces, General Tongogara, had been less concerned than Mugabe 
about the location of the assembly points, knowing that his men were close to the border in case 
the cease-fire should fall apart. It has been suggested that Mugabe mistrusted the British; that he 
was fearful of the designs of the Rhodesian military, that he was convinced that his forces would 
eventually triumph militarily, and that he may have been afraid for his life and of betraying the 
trust his people had invested in him. In the end, Mozambican President Machel, through his 
representative Honwana, allegedly told Robert Mugabe that if he did not sign he would be given 
a nice house on the beach in Mozambique (Davidow, 1984, p. 89).  
Why was an ultimatum from the man who controlled his guerrilla bases necessary to make 
Mugabe sign the cease-fire agreement? After all, Mugabe had compromised on the more 
important issue of land reform in the constitution without any ultimatum from Machel. The 
explanation for Mugabe's reluctance is simple: The Constitution created a repeated game, in 
which the Democratic strategy was rational. The cease-fire happened only once, and Mugabe's 
dominant strategy was the Military strategy. Indeed, Machel had to remind that "he would win 
the elections" (Davidow, 1984, p. 89). In Zimbabwe, it proved more difficult to reach agreement 
about the transitional government and the cease-fire conditions than the Constitution, nicely 
illustrating that in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, preferences determine the outcome, in 
contrast to the repeated versions of the game where the magnitude of the payoffs influence the 
choice of strategy.  
Let us now see how the actors dealt with the four limitations of contingent strategies in inducing 
co-operation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for a more complete understanding of the 
conditions that affected the choice between a Democratic strategy and a Military strategy, i.e. 
how did they overcome that 'Always military strategy' is always a sub-game perfect equilibrium; 
how did they made reciprocal punishments credible; how did they choose between the many 
possible equilibrium outcomes; and how did they find what equilibrium superstrategy they were 
playing to co-ordinate punishments to enforce co-operation?  
'Always Military Strategy' Is a Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium for Any Discount Parameter  
In Zimbabwe, both the Rhodesia Front and the ZANU moved from the Military strategy with 
great reluctance. The Rhodesia Front only accepted the Democratic strategy when the military 
defeat appeared imminent, even though it was a certainty in the long run from the moment the 
war began in earnest in 1974. The ZANU, who was on its way to victory in 1979, would neither 
have entered nor compromised in the Lancaster House negotiation, had it not been for pressure 
from the Front-line states, in particular Mozambique. In Angola, both the MPLA and UNITA 
initially hesitated somewhat in choosing the Military strategy, but once they had done so they 
stuck firmly to it.  
Contingent Strategies Need Credible Threats  
As an Assurance Game player, Joshua Nkomo's first choice was democracy, preferring electoral 
defeat to military victory. The relatively benign conflict between the two ethnic groups assured 
the Ndebele individual social mobility and respect for their group identity if they lost the 
elections. But of course he preferred a prominent political position in a democratic Zimbabwe. 
Nkomo realised that ZAPU had a much narrower ethnic constituency than ZANU, and his 
strategy was to win the elections by being the man to introduce majority rule in Zimbabwe, 
bending over backwards in his attempts to negotiate democracy in 1976 and 1978, until Ian 
Smith had demanded so many constraints on democracy that it no longer was democracy. ZANU 
and ZAPU had retained separate military forces also when united politically in the Patriotic Front 
during the negotiations in 1979, and Mugabe was so confident of victory that he split the 
Patriotic Front before the elections. Joshua Nkomo evidently hoped that the Patriotic Front 
umbrella would be used in the 1980 elections, but he suspected all along that Mugabe might 
jettison him, so his endorsement of democracy was not due to misperceptions (Stedman, 1991, p. 
202).  
Ironically, Nkomo's moderation deprived him of a credible threat to induce the RF 
tocompromise, and they turned him down both in 1976 and 1978. Nkomo adopted the Military 
strategy only when compromise seemed impossible, and when military inactivity had become a 
political liability. Assurance Game players will opt for the Military strategy if others choose the 
Military strategy. Interestingly, Nkomo's did not opt for guerrilla warfare, building a 
conventional force to deliver Salisbury the final blow (Tamarkin, 1990, p. 100). It was no 
coincidence that Nkomo's Military strategy led to very little actual fighting. Consequently, 
Nkomo's threat lacked credibility as a punishment to force the RF to a democratic compromise 
(Stedman, 1991, p. 69). It was the Prisoner's Dilemma player, Robert Mugabe, with forces 
obviously willing and able to inflict damage who could credibly threaten the Rhodesia Front to 
abandon the Military strategy. A contingent strategy needs a credible threat of continued conflict 
to induce democracy. This explains the paradoxical situation where the most conciliatory actor 
can not get a deal.  
Moreover, it was not a coincidence that the Lancaster House Conference was carried out during 
the bloodiest phase of the war, nor that two escalatory thresholds were crossed during the last 
months of the war: In mid-October 1979, Rhodesian forces, for the first time, attacked economic 
targets in Zambia and Mozambique; in the third week of October 1979, Mozambique began hot-
pursuit raids into Rhodesia after Rhodesian attacks. The purpose of both escalations was to 
demonstrate the ability and willingness to punish defections. Middle-ranking Rhodesian officers 
thought agreement at Lancaster House more likely if the credibility of the Rhodesian Army as a 
future threat was maintained (Stedman 1991:227-230). The Mozambican raids were carried out 
after agreement had been reached on the Constitution, and just before President Machel 
threatened Mugabe with political oblivion if he did not sign the cease-fire agreement. It was the 
Salisbury regime, the militarily weakest actor, and Mozambique, who was relatively less 
motivated than the Zimbabwean nationalist, that felt the need to demonstrate military prowess 
and resolve.  
Equilibrium Outcomes  
Lord Carrington gained control over the agenda by preserving the privilege to present proposals. 
Moreover, he and his team engaged in a kind of shuttle diplomacy; the actors sat in separate 
rooms, bargaining with Carrington rather than with each other. This minimised the problem 
created by the many equilibrium solutions, because all actors were forced to concentrate on the 
one and same solution. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the parties at Lancaster 
House had a wide zone of acceptable solutions. Roughly the same amounts of utility may be 
represented in many concrete ways, giving considerable leeway even with the thinnest of 
acceptance zones. Davidow (1984:110) argues that Carrington's tactics enabled him to obtain 
concessions from each party that they would not otherwise have granted, but more importantly, 
the parties were able to converge on an acceptable outcome in only four months.  
Equilibrium Strategies  
The need for a shared conjecture about what superstrategy they were playing proved to be no 
obstacle in Zimbabwe. The escalations during Lancaster House, the Rhodesian bombing of 
economic targets outside Rhodesia and the Mozambican hot-raid pursuits into Rhodesia, was 
interpreted as a round of Military strategy used for punishment within an overarching 
Democratic superstrategy and not as, say, the first move in 'Always military strategy' because 
they could not win the war for either party. In Angola, on the other hand, the precarious security 
situation for all concerned forced the interpretation "Always military strategy" on any use of the 
Military strategy because even minor gains could tilt the balance to either side.  
  
Implications for Transition to Democracy 
In addition to serving as a plausibility probe for deductive propositions derived from game 
theory, the Angola and Zimbabwe cases are an empirical source for inductively finding 
mechanisms that facilitate or hinder transitions to democracy. The purpose of the following 
section is to discuss the implications of these mechanisms.  
The consent of all actors is necessary for a transition to democracy to take place. Prisoner's 
Dilemma players who are relatively strong militarily and relatively weak electorally will reject 
democracy. The logical implications is that to avoid having one actor reject democracy the actors 
must operate in an environment of balance between relative military and electoral strength. That 
balance may come about in different ways: In Zimbabwe, ZANU and ZAPU were both balanced: 
the former was strong both militarily and electorally while the latter was weak on both scores. In 
Angola, only the MPLA was balanced with medium strength both militarily and electorally, 
making the situation difficult for a transition to democracy.  
Imbalances between electoral and military force among the actors may be redressed either by 
manipulating the electoral potential through the electoral system or by manipulating military 
strength. The ultimatum the Front-line States gave Robert Mugabe and South Africa's support of 
the Lancaster House agreement were crucial in manipulating the military balance but had no long 
term effects. The other way is to increase the payoffs from participation in democracy, for 
example the twenty seats reserved for Whites in Zimbabwe in a ten year transition period, has 
long term effects.  
The separation of substantive and constitutional issues. In Angola, the actors confronted both 
constitutional and substantive issues in the joint transitional government. The way the Angolan 
process was played out reveals two mechanisms. First, mixing substantive and constitutional 
issues made for a double one-shot game, preventing agreement on the constitution. Second, the 
intrusion of substantive issues in the constitutional process influenced the attitudes of the actors. 
Instead of bargaining and arguing in the constitutional process, only bargaining took place. 
Arguing means that the one with the best arguments prevails, whereas in bargaining the one with 
the most material resources prevails. Since all actors controlled military forces, bargaining meant 
civil war. The successful Lancaster House Conference had no administrative duties and avoided 
these pitfalls.(14) The process in Zimbabwe also reveals that separating substantive and 
constitutional issues enabled both parties to use substantive issues to enhance the credibility of 
future punishment that deterred the choice of the Military strategy and promoted the choice of 
the Democratic strategy. Thus, in Angola, the escalation of the war undermined the negotiations, 
whereas in Zimbabwe the escalation of the war was crucial in reaching agreement.  
The role of credibility in the transition process can be understood by contrasting the efforts of the 
Portuguese troops in Angola with the efforts of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in 
Zimbabwe. The CMF was an incredibly small, only thirteen hundred men. Both the Rhodesian 
Forces and the Liberation movements disposed of far larger numbers some 50,000 to 60,000 men 
each. The Governor during the transition, Lord Soames, lacked the means to force either side to 
comply with the agreement. The forces at his disposal were in fact so small that he had to use his 
brief authority as formal head of state to call in some Rhodesian forces to supervise the 
disarming of the guerrillas. However, the CMF entered Zimbabwe when there was agreement on 
a Constitution creating an iterated political game between the parties. It had a clearly defined 
plan of how they should monitor the cease-fire and disarm the belligerent parties. There were 16 
assembly areas, a pattern for deploying the force, and a time-table.  
According to Stedman, "The British plan can best be likened to transforming the conflict into a 
one-shot game of chicken: there may have been incentives to cheat and seek advantage of the 
cease-fire to cheat, but the costs of total breakdown were prohibitive" (1991, p. 208). I disagree 
because a one-shot game of chicken is not affected by the magnitude of the payoffs associated 
with the outcomes. In a game of Chicken, both players have an incentive to be the first to move 
to the Military strategy, presenting the other player with the choice between the S and CW 
outcome, obviously leading to the transition to democracy to fail. The importance of the CMF 
was that it transformed the transition and cease-fire process into a repeated game. First, the task 
of disarming the actors were deliberately left out of the mandate of the CMF, the force only 
carried out the task of geographically distancing the parties (Ginifer, 1995, pp. 52-55). Thus, 
both parties retained their arms and their ability to deter defection from the peace agreement. 
ZANU had faced a dilemma in the locations of the assembly points: Centrally located assembly 
points were an advantage in the election campaign, but, on the other hand, it was easier to escape 
across the border from peripherally located ones. But ZANU's military leader, General 
Tongogara, had made sure that sufficient numbers of guerrillas would escape to deny Rhodesia 
Front military victory, and he was able to keep some of his best fighters out of them altogether. 
The Rhodesians fear that sufficient numbers of guerrillas would turn up to stay at the assembly 
points disappeared when Governor Soames called in Rhodesian forces and police to monitor 
them. The geographical space between them reassured against a surprise attack, preserving their 
deterrence capability. Second, Lord Soames attributed the success to the fact that the neutral 
troops were located with the opposing forces of either side, not between them (Soames, 1980, p. 
413). The parties could neither leave their own assembly areas nor attack the enemy's without 
getting into conflict with the CMF. The CMF was a hostage to guarantee that parties reneging on 
the Lancaster House agreement needed to take long term external hostility into consideration as 
well as the admittedly limited immediate costs of taking on an additional 1,300 men. The merger 
of the three forces into a new army did not go smoothly, in March 1981 there was a mutiny and 
fighting between ZANU and ZAPU elements, but the situation stabilised (Berdal, 1996, p. 55).  
Third, the CMF was capable of some coercion. For example, one ZANU candidate was banned 
from the elections, and the CMF did apply force in order to keep things as calm as possible 
during the elections. On the other hand, when the question arose of banning Robert Mugabe's 
party from the elections because of alleged intimidation, Lord Carrington aptly summarises the 
position of Lord Soames, "It [banning Mugabe] was obviously an option, but it was not an 
option" (Charlton, 1990, p. 143). Thus, the Third Party contribution to the peaceful transition to 
democracy in Zimbabwe had three elements. The transition was credibly transformed from a 
one-shot game to a repeated game by gathering but not disarming the parties and by risking 
1,300 hostages to guarantee that reneging the agreement would not be forgotten by the outside 
world. In other words, spontaneous compliance was carefully nurtured. Finally, the CMF added 
some enforced compliance during a critical phase of the transition to democracy.  
The Portuguese force of 24,000 men was the militarily strongest force in Angola during 
thewhole of 1975. In contrast to the Commonwealth force, the Portuguese could easily have 
withstood the combined military forces of the three Angolan liberation movements (Marcum, 
1978, p. 255). The force was responsible for running the country and monitoring the cease-fire 
during the transition period until the new government had been elected. The Portuguese military 
commanders lacked a sense of purpose and direction on how to achieve these general objectives. 
The Portuguese commanders only wanted to withdraw from their own lost cause in Angola, a 
desire that did not lead them to create a plan themselves. To be effective, external military forces 
need a concrete political plan creating an iterated game between the local belligerents in place. 
Their own role has to be reduced to reassure the parties that their mutual deterrence does not 
enable any party to defect, while adding a little deterrence of their own. The fate of the 
Portuguese forces in Angola is a reminder that the organisation of the transition, not credibility 
and numbers, is the key to success, although the willingness to commit large numbers of troops 
can of course be a way to gain credibility.  
The transition is a one-shot game where the magnitude of the payoffs of the alternative outcomes 
does not influence the outcome, meaning that the terms of the transition does not influence 
whether the probability of successfully implementing the agreement. The use of Rhodesian 
armed forces and police, under CMF supervision, was tolerable to the guerrillas. The problem is 
that terms rarely are purely transitional. For example, the location of the assembly point had 
long-term influence because ZANU used guerrillas for Mao-style political mobilisation, and lack 
of assembly points located in central Zimbabwe hurt ZANU's election campaign. Another 
example is the Patriotic Front's demand of power-sharing and a six months transition period to 
establish themselves in the competition with Muzorewa's UANC. When Muzorewa and the 
Rhodesia Front would only accept a shorter transition period without any participation in the 
government, they also unintentionally favoured ZANU vis-à-vis ZAPU. Nkomo needed the extra 
time and the status in the election campaign more than Mugabe, whose guerrillas had liberated 
and mobilised large parts of Shonaland long before the transition.  
  
Conclusion 
The different fates of the attempts to solve the conflict in Angola and Zimbabwe are neither 
explained by the intensity of the ethnic conflict, nor by the actors' preferences about democracy, 
nor by their political identities. Political outcomes such as transitions to democracy are 
influenced by but not determined by social forces. Societies with the same amount of ethnic 
strife, in which the leaders continue to have the same preferences for belligerence, may choose 
different political alternatives. The chance that the leaders of armed ethnic groups choose 
democracy increases if constitutional issues are kept separate from substantive ones. 
Furthermore, if democracy is an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, each player must succeed in 
striking a balance between the need for establishing a credible threat to punish future defections 
from democracy and the need to alleviate the fear of defection from democracy. Third Party 
intervention may thus aid the parties to achieve spontaneous compliance during the transition, 
but is no substitute for it.  
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Marie W. Nyhamar, Bjørn Erik Rasch and Anne Julie Semb for valuable comments that by no 
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requires incomplete information about the payoffs of the other player, but uncertainty about 
whether your opponents knows that you know that she knows that one of the two is rational, is 
sufficient to generate co-operative strategies in equilibrium if the game has a finite number of 
repetitions (Kreps & Wilson, 1982; Cohen, 1994, pp. 49-52).  
3.  A sub-game perfect equilibrium consists of strategies that are not only a Nash equilibrium for 
the whole game but also are a Nash equilibrium for all sub-games. The whole game in this case 
is a series of Prisoner's Dilemma games, and since MS is the dominant strategy in Prisoner's 
Dilemma K must be a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Whereas Nash equilibria allow players to 
make non-credible threats provided that they never have to carry them out, sub-game perfect 
equilibria eliminate such solutions from the game. Such Nash equilibria are based on behaviour 
off the equilibrium path, which prevent them from being established with the stability desirable 
to count as a solution of the game. For more on sub-game perfect equilibria, see Hovi & Rasch, 
1993, pp. 71-72 and Morrow, 1994, pp.128ff).  
4.  For analyses of nationalist ideology of the three movements, see Marcum, 1978 and Legum 
(ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76 p. B422ff.  
5.  For social and economic conditions in Rhodesia before 1980, see Lan, 1985, pp. 121-123, 
Stoneman & Cliffe, 1989, p. 124; and Tamarkin, 1990.  
6.  Regarding ethnic relations in Zimbabwe, see: Rinehart, 1983; Kaplan, 1983; Lan,1985, pp. 
217-228; Chainawa,1985, pp. 202-219; Stoneman & Cliffe (1989 nationalist ideology of the 
three movements, see Marcum, 1978 and Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76 p. 
B422ff.) and Ngcongo, 1989, pp. 106-111.  
7.  For the text of the Alvor Accord, see Legum, Colin (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record 1974-
75, p. B221-226. For analyses of the events in Angola in 1975, see Legum, Colin (ed.) Africa 
Contemporary Record 1975-76, p. B421ff; Marcum, 1978; and Klinghoffer, 1980.  
8.  Legum, Colin (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1979-80, p. B977.  
9.  British Diplomat A. 1987. Interview with Stephen John Steadman (Stedman, 1993, p.138).  
10.  I draw on the description of the beginnings of Angolan nationalism in Marcum, 1969. On 
Roberto's support over the years from the US, Great Britain, various other Western European 
states, some Eastern European states, the Soviet Union, various Arabic states and other African 
states, see Marcum, 1978, p. 122.  
11.  UNITA's preferences over strategies have changed repeatedly, but its preferences about 
democracy have not. In 1992, Savimbi preferred elections to continued military stalemate, 
clearly counting on winning the elections. However, although the largest ethnic group in Angola, 
the Ovimbundus remain a minority. The UNITA lost the elections to the MPLA, advocating a 
more encompassing Angolan nationalism. When the hope of electoral victory had been 
substituted with electoral defeat, and the military balance changed because the MPLA had 
disarmed while the UNITA had not, Jonas Savimbi adapted to the new military situation by 
switching back to the Military strategy.  
12.  Legum, Colin (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1978-79, p. B996-B977.  
13.  British Diplomat A. 1987. Interview with Stephen John Steadman (Stedman, 1993, p. 138).  
14.  Elster, 1993a, p. 15), Elster, 1993b, pp. 169-217. The problems with substantive and 
constitutional issues are discussed in Przeworski, 1991, p. 79ff; Colomer, 1991, pp. 1283-1302; 
and Colomer, 1995, pp. 74-85).  
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